Well – that’s not a particularly kind paraphrase of what is known as Meinongian position. In their own words they would say not that non-existent objects exist. They want to stay true to the reasonably common sense position that non-existent objects don’t exist. However, they will claim that while they categorically don’t exist, nevertheless it is true to say that in some sense there are non-existent objects.
And here is one argument commonly cited for their position.
1) The sentence “Pegasus is a winged horse” is true.
2) If it is true that Pegasus is a winged horse, then it is true that there is something is a winged horse.
3) Therefore, there is something that is a winged horse.
But given that we know certainly that Pegasus does not exist, we’ve just shown that there is something that does not exist. But don’t we mean the same things by “there is” “exists”? We seem to have proved that we must not. The argument is valid by virture of its form – so if the premises 1) and 2) are true, 3) must follow. However one might think there is something wrong with one of the premises. But which one and why?
If you think the argument is too silly to be worth even considering, then take note of the following analogous case:
1) The sentence “Two plus two equals four” is true.
2) If it is true that two plus two equals four, then it is true that there is something which, when added to two, equals four.
3) Therefore there is something which, when added to two, equals four.
We seem to have just proved the existence of the number 2 – but in what sense does the number 2 exist? In contemporary philosophy of mathematics, the realist view of mathematical objects is arguably the dominant position – and this is one of the arguments for their position (although certainly not the strongest). Nevertheless, if this kind of argument is fine for the mathematical case – in what sense does it fail for objects that don’t exist?
3 Comments
Pegasus is as an idea.Not an object.
Two exists as a mapping concept.Not an object in and of itself.Anything can be asigned the label two for the purposes of mapping.That doesn’t make the object “two” or make two exist any less because it’s not an object.
If its an object because we think of maybe say, a horse as a type of object and relate the “idea” to it.Then its a case of labeling the “non-exsistant object or concept” to the idea of what we know as an object.
It’s not a non existant object.It’s a concept labled as an object.It’s a thought.no more, no less.And Im not sure thoughts are objects in the known sence, Unless we weigh them right? Because, unless I’m forgetting something, objects are “real things” no weightless ideas.Am I wrong? Am I forgetting cases of ideas labled as objects? Sorry for my ignorance in all this.I’m a metaphysical philosophical enthusist, not uni student.As I’m sure you can tell
But what I like about humans is the faith of believing without seeing.That what causes concept discoveries and runs of certain ideas to exist at all! Awwww bless!
P.S. Hi Dan! *waves* xXx
Hey there Serena!
I must admit – I still don’t understand fully why the philosophers don’t like a suggestion such as yours (the idea one)… I’ve been toying around with a similar approach myself – but I’m not sure how to make it work.
Philosophers like Meinong want various sorts of sentences to come out true eg:
“There is no greater detective than Sherlock Holmes”.
Some would like to say that this sentence is true – and objectively true at that. The problem for someone who says that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is just an idea is the following: Imagine world which is just like our own except that Conan Doyle never wrote the Sherlock Holmes stories (and nor did anyone else). In this world, is it still true that no detective is greater than sherlock holmes? Well, presumably yes, because this world is just like our own in all other relevent respects. There seems to be something objective about that truth…
Other philosophers would just think these sorts of sentences aren’t true at all… and for that reason would be happy to think of them as ideas.
But I wonder if it’s possible to have our cake and eat it too here? What about a class of truths that are made subjectively true by individuals. So the sherlock holmes statement could be made true in our world by the existence of the idea, but would be false in our imagined world, because that idea wouldn’t exist in that possible world.
But this would introduce a class of truths that are dependent on what we think and imagine – which I’m unlikely to be able to on-sell as a plausible idea. Philosophers like to believe that truth is independent of us… Still… I keep toying with the idea…
So as far as I’m concerned your suggestion has considerable merit… but I think the philosophic community would be against us! Thanks for the comment…
FINE!
Bring it Mr philosophic dudes!
It’s a handicap tag match!
Dan and Sez Vs. ENTIRE PHILOSOPHIC COMMUNITY!
With your book smarts, and my ability to exploit people with book smarts.it’s a win win situation dude!
xXx
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